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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE LOWER COURT 
This case is a civil action to enforce a promissory 
Note and Trust Deed brought by Appellees herein, referred to col-
lectively hereafter as "Security Funding," in the Third Judicial-
District Court for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, Civil 
No. C85-761. See Complaint and Amended Complaint, R. at 2-9, 
52-60. The signer of the Note and Trust Deed, McDonald Brothers, 
Inc. (hereafter "McDonald Brothers") raised various defenses to 
the enforcement of the Note and Trust Deed, and also counter-
claimed for damages against Security Funding. See Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim, R. at 63-77. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues raised by this Appeal are as follows: 
A. Did the trial court properly rule that Security 
Funding did not have the duties alleged by McDonald Brothers? 
B. Did the trial court properly rule that McDonald 
Brothers' Note and Trust Deed was supported by consideration? 
C. Did the trial court properly rule that McDonald 
Brothers1 obligations under the Note and Trust Deed were not 
discharged? 
D. Were costs and fees awarded by the trial court 
proper? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT. 
Security Funding moved for summary judgment in its 
favor on its Amended Complaint to enforce McDonald Brothers' 
Trust Deed and Note, and on McDonald Brothers' Counterclaim for 
fraud and negligence; and filed an exhaustive Supporting Memoran-
dum in support of that motion. See Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 366-410. McDonald 
Brothers thereupon filed cross motions to dismiss Security 
Funding's Amended Complaint, and for summary judgment on its 
Counterclaim, and supporting memorandum. See R. at 413-415, 
416-426. McDonald Brothers also filed a lengthy memorandum 
opposing Security Funding's motion for summary judgment, which 
did not provide any citations to the record to dispute Security 
Funding's Statement of Undisputed Facts. See R. at 427-467. 
The hearing on all pending motions of the parties was 
held on January 12, 1987, before the Honorable Michael J. Murphy 
of the Third District Court. At the hearing, Judge Murphy indi-
cated that he was inclined to grant Security Funding's motion for 
summary judgment because McDonald Brothers had failed to provide 
the Court with any citations to the record creating a genuine 
issue of material fact. See Memorandum Decision and Order dated 
April 9, 1987, R. at 532-540. The Court permitted McDonald 
Brothers to submit a supplemental brief containing appropriate 
citations to the record that it contended created a genuine issue 
of material fact. Id. Thereafter, McDonald Brothers filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum containing citations to the record, and 
Security Funding submitted a Reply Memorandum. See R. at 
482-494, 495-520. 
On April 9, 1987 Judge Murphy issued his Memorandum 
Decision and Order granting the motion of Security Funding for 
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summary judgment and denying McDonald Brothers' motions. R. at 
532-540. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS. 
The following statement of facts is taken for the most 
part from citations to the record set out in the Statement of 
Undisputed Facts contained in Security Funding's Summary Judgment 
Memorandum, and in Security Funding's Reply to Defendants' Sup-
plemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. at 368-377, 464-499. Additional citations to the 
record are included as necessary to respond to contentions and 
arguments raised by McDonald Brothers for the first time on this 
appeal. These facts are not controverted by any evidence cited 
to by McDonald Brothers either before the lower court or in its 
Brief filed on this appeal. 
1. At all times relevant to this case, McDonald 
Brothers was a Utah corporation engaged in buying and developing 
real property. See Deposition of Stevenson McDonald dated May 
13, 1985, at 4-6 (cited as "S. McDonald Depo."), R. at 708, 702.2 
Although this Statement of Facts is lengthy, Security Fund-
ing believes that a working familiarity with the events giv-
ing rise to this litigation is absolutely essential to the 
Court's consideration of this appeal. This is particularly 
true since McDonald Brothers has frequently omitted cita-
tions to the record both in its Statement of Facts, and in 
referring to alleged "facts" in the body of its Brief. 
McDonald Brothers also sets forth a number of facts that it 
claims are "undisputed," or "agreed," which are either con-
tradicted by the record or are gross misstatements of the 
record. These alleged "facts," will be refuted in the argu-
ment portions of this Brief. 
Curiously, many of the depositions are present in duplicate 
in the record. Both record citations will be given in this 
Brief. 
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Stevenson McDonald was the president of McDonald Brothers. 
Howard McDonald was a general partner in a partnership known as 
Silverwood Estates, in which McDonald Brothers was also a part-
ner. See Deposition of Howard McDonald dated May 13, 1985, at 
4-7 (cited as "H. McDonald Depo."), R. at 703, 709. 
2. In the spring of 1981, Silverwood Estates was 
in dire need of approximately three million dollars to complete a 
large condominium project. See H. McDonald Depo., at 18-19, R. 
at 703, 709. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to secure a 
loan on behalf of Silverwood Estates from banks and savings and 
loans, Howard McDonald contacted Larry Sorenson ("Sorenson") as a 
potential source for locating a three million dollar loan. See 
H. McDonald Depo., at 19-20, 22, R. at 703, 709. 
3. Howard and Stevenson McDonald (hereafter col-
lectively referred to as "McDonalds") thereafter met with 
Sorenson and engaged the services of Sorenson to obtain the three 
million dollar loan for them. See S. McDonald Depo., at 10-11, 
19, R. at 708, 702; H. McDonald Depo, at 18-21, R. at 703, 709; 
Deposition of Larry Sorenson dated May 5, 1986, at 21, 18-29 
(cited as "Sorenson Depo. No. 2"), R. at 699, 714. McDonald 
Brothers paid some of Sorenson's expenses to find a source for 
its three million dollar loan, and was also to pay Sorenson a 
commission out of the loan proceeds. Deposition of Larry 
Sorenson dated May 7, 1985 (cited as "Sorenson Depo. No. 1"), at 
30-31, 62, R. at 707, 713; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 25-27, R. at 
699, 714. 
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4. In connection with his attempts to obtain a 
loan for McDonald Brothers, Sorenson contacted Bob Kenner, an 
independent loan broker residing in California. Sorenson Depo. 
No. 2, at 17-18, R. at 699, 714. Around the first of August, 
1981, Sorenson was informed that Kenner had found a source of 
money for the three million dollar loan that Sorenson was seeking 
for McDonald Brothers. Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 34, R. at 699, 
714. Sorenson contacted Kenner, who informed him of a woman in 
California named Linda Currier ("Currier") who had produced a 
large loan and needed to borrow $288,000.00 in closing costs. 
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 34-35, R. at 699, 714. 
5. Thereafter, Sorenson and Dean Zabriskie 
("Zabriskie"), Sorenson*s attorney, went to Pasadena, California 
to meet with Currier. Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 40-41, R. at 699, 
714; Deposition of Dean Zabriskie dated May 5, 1986, at 12-15 
(cited as "Zabriskie Depo. No. 2"), R. at 706, 710. 
6. At the Pasadena meeting, Currier explained 
that she had already incurred $288,000.00 in "closing costs" for 
a large loan of billions of dollars (hereafter "Currier Loan") 
and required a loan for the $288,000.00 in closing costs. 
Currier indicated that the proceeds of the Currier Loan would be 
used to fund smaller loans, and that McDonalds Brothers1 three 
million dollar loan could be funded out of these proceeds through 
Sorenson. Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 42-44, R. at 699, 714. It 
was clear from the Pasadena meeting that the closing costs had to 
be prepaid before the Currier Loan would come through. Zabriskie 
Depo. No. 2, at 15-19, 28-29, R. at 706, 710. 
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7. Thereafter, Sorenson and Zabriskie were par-
ties to a taped telephone call (hereafter "Taped Conversation") 
with Currier and a man calling himself "Sasha Teplitz" 
("Teplitz"), In the Taped Conversation, Teplitz explained that 
$288,000.00 in closing costs had already been incurred by Currier 
for the large loan of billions of dollars, i.e., the Currier 
Loan, and that Currier needed to obtain a loan for the 
$288,000.00. Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 9-10, 28-31, 33-34, R. at 
706, 710; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 55-58, R. at 699, 714. 
8. It was clear from the Taped Conversation that 
the $288,000.00 in closing costs had already been incurred, and 
that this amount would have to be paid by Currier before the 
Currier Loan would close. See Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 56-58, R. 
at 699, 714; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 20-21, 27, R. at 707, 713; 
Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 17-18, 30-33, 80-81, 93, R. at 706, 
710. Sorenson and Zabriskie both understood from the Taped Con-
versation that the $288,000.00 would be "at risk" during a three 
to seven day period before the Currier Loan closed, and that the 
$288,000.00 to be loaned to Currier was not reimbursable regard-
less of whether the Currier Loan failed to close. Sorenson Depo. 
No. 2, at 57-58, 67-71, R. at 699-714; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 
17-18, 30-34, 80-81, R. at 706, 710; Zabriskie Depo No. 1, at 
71-72, R. at 698, 712. 
9. The Taped Conversation also explained that 
the $288,000.00 would have to be wired by the lender directly to 
Teplitz, i.e. to an account under the control of Teplitz referred 
to in the Taped Conversation and thereafter by the parties as the 
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"Fourex" account. See Deposition of David Garrett dated November 
14, 1983, at 5-6, 11-12, 19-22, 42-43 (cited as "Garrett Depo. 
No. 1"), R. at 718; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 62-63, 129-130, R. 
at 699, 714; Deposition of R. Christenson dated May 8, 1985, at 
22-24 (cited as "Robert Christenson Depo."), R. at 700; Deposi-
tion of N. Christenson, dated May 8, 1985, at 11-13 (cited as 
"Neil Christenson Depo."), R. at 701, 711; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, 
at 15-18, 28-33, R. at 706, 710; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 25-27, 
72, R. at 707, 713. Sorenson had the understanding that Teplitz 
was acting as an "escrow agent" for Currier with respect to the 
$288,000.00 loan, and that the "escrow" account where the 
$288,000.00 was to be wired was Sasha Teplitz's "Fourex" account. 
See Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 26-27, R. at 707-713. 
10. Sorenson thereafter began to look for poten-
tial sources for the $288,000.00 loan to Currier. Sorenson Depo. 
No. 1, at 23, R. at 707, 713. Sorenson wanted to obtain the 
closing costs for the Currier Loan so that he could then obtain 
the three million dollar loan for McDonald Brothers from the pro-
ceeds. Sorenson was also to obtain a $100,000.00 finder's fee 
from Currier out of the loan proceeds, in exchange for finding a 
lender for the $288,000.00. Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 71-72, R. 
at 707, 713. Sorenson was subsequently given the name of Neil 
Christenson of Security Funding Corporation as a potential lender 
of the $288,000.00 to Currier. Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 9-10, R. 
at 703, 713. 
11. Around the first of August 1981, Sorenson and 
Zabriskie met with Security Funding representatives to solicit 
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them to loan the $288,000.00 to Currier. At this meeting, the 
Taped Conversation was played. Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 32-33, 
R. at 707, 713; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 73, R. at 699, 714; R. 
Christenson Depo., at 14-15, R. at 700. 
12. Security Funding agreed to loan the 
$288,000.00 to Currier only if sufficient collateral for the loan 
was provided. See Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 36-38, 44-45, R. at 
706, 710; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 15-16, 36-37, R. at 707, 713; 
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 65-66, R. at 699, 714; N. Christenson 
Depo., at 16, 23-24, R. at 701, 711; Zabriskie Depo. No. 1, at 
34-35, R. at 706, 710. 
13. Thereafter, Sorenson approached Stevenson 
McDonald and requested him to provide security for the 
$288,000.00 loan by signing a Trust Deed and Note in favor of 
Security Funding. Dean Zabriskie was also present at this meet-
ing. Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 35-37, R. at 707, 713. Sorenson 
represented to Stevenson McDonald that by providing security for 
the $288,000.00 loan to Currier, McDonald Brothers would ulti-
mately obtain its three million dollar loan from the proceeds of 
the Currier Loan, as well as a $250,000.00 bonus to be paid by 
Currier from the loan proceeds. Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 35-37, 
68-72, R. at 707, 713; H. McDonald Depo., at 16-17, 42-43, R. at 
703, 709; S. McDonald Depo., at 14, 29-30, R. at 702, 708. At 
this meeting, the McDonalds also listened to the Taped Conversa-
tion in which Teplitz explained the nature of the loan transac-
tion. See H. McDonald Depo., at 16, 26, R. at 703, 709. 
-8-
14. On or about August 21, 1981, Robert 
Lamoreaux, a law partner of Zabriskie1s, met with Stevenson 
McDonald to have him execute the Trust Deed and Note in favor of 
Security Funding. S. McDonald Depo., at 16-18, R. at 702, 708. 
Stevenson McDonald executed the Trust Deed and Note on behalf of 
McDonald Brothers and gave them to Lamoreaux, with the under-
standing that they would be delivered to and relied upon by Secu-
rity Funding as security for the $288,000.00 loan. id.; H. 
McDonald Depo., at 31-36, R. at 703, 709. Stevenson McDonald and 
Security Funding also executed escrow instructions to Barrett 
Title, which instructions provided that Barrett Title could rec-
ord McDonald Brothers1 Trust Deed if the $288,000.00 was not paid 
to Security Funding within twenty days. See Exhibit 3, H. 
McDonald Depo., R. at 703, 709; S. McDonald Depo., at 9-10, R. at 
702, 708. 
15. Based on the meeting with Sorenson and 
Zabriskie, Stevenson McDonald knew and understood that the 
McDonald Brothers would not actually receive the $288,000.00 from 
Security Funding; and knew and understood that the $288,000.00 
would be sent by Security Funding directly to a third party 
[Currier] whose identity Stevenson McDonald knew at the time, but 
could not recall at the time of his deposition. S. McDonald 
Depo., at 14-20, 26, 28-35, R. at 702, 708; see also H. McDonald 
Depo., at 33-34, R. at 703, 709. Stevenson McDonald did not 
expect to have any control over the release of the $288,000.00 
loan by Security Funding to Currier; and was relying on Sorenson 
and Zabriskie to protect his interests in the transaction. S. 
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McDonald Depo., at 14-20, 26, 28-35, R. at 702, 708; see also H. 
McDonald Depo., at 37, 41, 76-77, R. at 703, 709. 
16. In addition to the Trust Deed and Note pro-
vided by Stevenson McDonald, Currier provided her own property in 
California as security for the $288,000.00 loan and executed two 
Notes in the total amount of $288,000.00 in favor of Security 
Funding. See R. Christenson Depo., at 14-16, 20-21, Exhibits 6 
and 7, R. at 700. 
17. It was the understanding and intent of Secu-
rity Funding, Sorenson and Zabriskie at all times that Currier 
was primarily obligated to repay the $288,000.00 to Security 
Funding, and that Currier's property was to be resorted to first 
by Security Funding in the event that the Currier Loan failed to 
close within the three to seven days anticipated. See Sorenson 
Depo. No. 2, at 63-65, 69, 69-71, R. at 699, 714; R. Christenson 
Depo., Exhibit 15; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 33-35, 35-36, 68-71, 
R. at 707, 713; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 16-17, 37-38, 43-44, R. 
at 706, 710; Zabriskie Depo. No. 1, at 34-35, 70, R. at 698, 712. 
18. In addition to the Currier and McDonald 
Brothers properties, Mountain West America also signed a Trust 
Deed and Note in favor of Security Funding to secure the 
$288,000.00 loaned by Security Funding to Currier. See Sorenson 
Depo. No. 1, at 46-48, R. at 707, 713. It was the understanding 
and intent of Sorenson and Security Funding that the Mountain 
West America property was to be used only as temporary collateral 
until title reports were obtained on the other security for the 
$288,000.00 loan, at which time the Mountain West Trust Deed was 
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to be released. Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 47-48, R. at 707, 713; 
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 58-59, R. at 699, 714; R. Christenson 
Depo., Exhibit 15. It was ultimately determined that a falsified 
title report had been issued for the Mountain West property, and 
that the Trust Deed was valueless. See N. Christenson Depo., at 
34, R. at 701, 711; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 47, R. at 707, 713. 
19. On August 21, 1981, Sorenson and Zabriskie 
flew to Camden, New Jersey with David Garrett of Security Funding 
to meet with Currier and Teplitz ("New Jersey Meeting"). 
Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 23-24, R. at 707, 713; Sorenson Depo. 
No. 2, at 110-111, R. at 699, 714; Deposition of David Garrett 
dated May 8, 1985 (hereafter "Garrett Depo. No. 2"), at 11-12, R. 
at 704, 715. Stevenson McDonald was informed that Sorenson and 
Zabriskie were in Camden, New Jersey, by Lamoreaux and was rely-
ing on Sorenson and Zabriskie to protect his interests. S. 
McDonald Depo., at 14-20, 28-35, R. at 702, 708; H. McDonald 
Depo., at 30-32, 37, 41, 76-77, R. at 703, 709; Sorenson Depo. 
No. 2, at 62, R. at 699, 714. 
20. Sorenson's purpose for going to the New Jer-
sey Meeting was to see that the Currier Loan closed so that he 
could then obtain the three million dollar loan for McDonald 
Brothers from the proceeds of the Currier Loan. Sorenson Depo. 
No. 2, at 71-73, R. at 699, 714. Zabriskie was representing 
Sorenson while in New Jersey. Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 24, R. at 
707, 713; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 48-50, R. at 706, 710. 
21. Security Funding's purposes in sending 
Garrett to the New Jersey Meeting were to assure that its 
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collateral was properly in place before the $288,000.00 was wired 
to the "Fourex" account upon the instructions of Currier/Teplitz; 
and to generally assure itself that Currier and Teplitz were 
legitimate. See Garrett Depo. No. 1 at 9, 12-16, R. at 718; 
Garrett Depo. No. 2, at 16, R. at 704, 715; N. Christenson Depo. 
at 24, R. at 701, 711. 
22. During the New Jersey Meeting, Security Fund-
ing wired the $288,000.00 to an account in New Jersey under 
Teplitz1s name, called the "Fourex" account, upon the instruction 
of Teplitz and Currier, as conveyed through David Garrett. 
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 59-63, 109-110, 129-130, R. at 699, 714; 
Garrett Deposition No. 1, at 5-6, 19-22, 42-43, R. at 718; 
Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 23-27, 29, 34, 70-72, R. at 707, 713; 
Zabriskie Depo. No. 2, at 15-18, 28-33, 50, R. at 706, 710; 
Zabriskie Depo. No. 1, at 30-31, R. at 698, 712; N. Christenson 
Depo., at 11-13, 25-26, R. at 701, 711; Garrett Depo. No. 2, at 
11-12, R. at 718; R. Christenson Depo., at 22-24, R. at 700. 
These instructions were consistent with those in the Taped Con-
versation. See Zabriskie Depo. No. 1, at 55-56, R. at 698, 712; 
Garrett Depo. No. 1 at 5-6, 11-12, 19-22, 42-43, R. at 718; 
Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 61-63, 107, 109-110, 129-130, R. at 699, 
714; R. Christenson Depo. at 22-24, R. at 700; N. Christenson 
Depo. at 11-13, R. at 701, 711; Zabriskie Depo. No. 2 at 15-18, 
28-33, R. at 706, 710. The $288,000.00 was in fact received in 
the "Fourex" account. See N. Christenson Depo., at 25, R. at 
701, 711; Garrett Depo. No. 1, at 21, R. at 718. Sorenson was 
aware that the transfer of the $288,000.00 to the "Fourex" 
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account in New Jersey was taking place at the time the transfer 
was being made. Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 109-110, R. at 699, 714. 
23. After the money was wired to the "Fourex" 
account, Garrett, Zabriskie, Currier and Teplitz flew to Nassau 
where the closing of the Currier loan was supposed to take place. 
Garrett Depo. No. 1, at 26-27, R. at 718; Garrett Depo. No. 2, at 
22-24, R. at 704, 715. Garrett had no specific purpose for going 
to Nassau, and was invited along by Currier to be present when 
the loan closed. Id. 
24. McDonald Brothers never received its expected 
three million dollar loan from the Currier Loan funds. There is 
no evidence in the record to indicate whether or not Currier in 
fact had a potential loan for billions of dollars that she and 
Teplitz were attempting to close. In addition, there is no evi-
dence in the record on whether or not the $288,000.00 was or was 
not used to pay the closing costs that had already been incurred 
for such a loan. 
25. McDonald Brothers kept in close touch with 
Sorenson and Zabriskie concerning the status of the Currier Loan 
after the New Jersey meeting. S. McDonald Depo., at 23, R. at 
702, 708; H. McDonald Depo., at 45-47, R. at 703, 709; Zabriskie 
Depo. No. 2, at 88-90, R. at 706, 710. 
26. In November of 1981, an Agreement was entered 
into between Sorenson and Security Funding. See Sorenson Depo. 
No. 2, at 76-78, R. at 699, 714; Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 66-68, 
R. at 707, 713. In this Agreement: 
-13-
a. Security Funding agreed to extend the 
time for filing a notice of default against the McDonald property 
until January 15, 1982; 
b. Security Funding agreed to release its 
Trust Deed on the property of Mountain West America, according to 
the prior agreement of the parties; 
c. Security Funding agreed to release the 
McDonalds' property if amounts due under the Note were paid by or 
on behalf of Currier during the life of the Agreement; and 
d. Sorenson agreed to satisfy the obliga-
tion to Security Funding if he consummated another transaction 
similar to that of the Currier Loan. Sorenson Depo. No. 2, 
Exhibit 15, R. at 699, 714. 
27. Sometime in July of 1982 the McDonalds were 
contacted by Garrett of Security Funding by telephone. This was 
the first time any representative of McDonald Brothers had ever 
spoken to anyone from Security Funding. H. McDonald Depo., at 
47-48, R. at 703, 709. Howard and Stevenson McDonald subse-
quently met with representatives of Security Funding. H. 
McDonald Depo., at 47-48, R. at 703, 709; N. Christenson Depo., 
at 32-33, R. at 701, 711. 
28. During the first meeting with Security Fund-
ing in July of 1982, McDonald Brothers indicated that it was 
still hopeful that the Currier Loan would go through. H. 
McDonald Depo., at 47-48, R. at 703, 709; S. McDonald Depo., at 
22-23, R. at 702, 708. Thereafter, the McDonalds met several 
times with representatives of Security Funding to discuss the 
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progress of the Currier Loan. At these meetings, Security Fund-
ing indicated that it wanted to extend the time for Currier to 
repay the $288,000.00, and the McDonalds indicated that they 
thought it would be a good idea to extend the time for Currier to 
perform. H. McDonald Depo., at 48-49, 51-52, R. at 703, 709. 
29. In approximately November of 1983, Security 
Funding brought an action to foreclose on Currier's property in 
California, Case No. NEC35385. R. at 408-409. Through this 
action, Security Funding obtained $157,347.00, which amount was 
applied to the accrued interest under the Note executed by 
McDonald Brothers. 
30. In February of 1985 Security Funding brought 
this action to enforce the Note and Trust Deed given by McDonald 
Brothers. R. at 2. On June 2, 1987 judgment was entered against 
McDonald Brothers in the total amount of $505,261.12 in favor of 
Security Funding. R. at 645-649. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
McDonald Brothers makes three primary arguments in sup-
port of its contentions that summary judgment in favor of Secu-
rity Funding was improperly granted by the trial court; and that 
summary judgment in favor of McDonald Brothers was improperly 
denied. 
In Points I and II of its Brief, McDonald Brothers 
argues that Security Funding breached various duties allegedly 
owed to it by failing to assure (1) that the $288,000.00 in fact 
was used for closing costs; (2) that the $288,000.00 was not 
released to Currier until the Currier loan was closed; (3) by 
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failing to establish an "escrow account" or act as an "escrow 
agent" on behalf of McDonald Brothers; and (4) by failing to 
assure that McDonald Brothers received its 3 million dollar loan. 
Security Funding1s response to these contentions is that there is 
no probative evidence in the record to suggest that it agreed to 
such duties; and that such duties cannot be implied in law under 
the undisputed facts in the record. Because Security Funding 
cannot be charged with the alleged duties as a matter of law, 
McDonald Brothers1 arguments in Points I and II of its Brief are 
without merit. 
In Point III of its Brief McDonald Brothers argues that 
the "bargained for" consideration for the Note and Trust Deed was 
Security Funding's "promise . . . to pay the closing costs on the 
Currier loan, so that the McDonalds could obtain their $3 million 
financing." This argument fails as a matter of law, on the 
ground that Security Funding made no such promise to McDonald 
Brothers; and any such promise made by Sorenson or Zabriskie is 
3 
not attributable to it, as a matter of law. 
Point IV of McDonald Brothers1 Brief argues that 
because Security Funding allegedly extended the time for Currier 
to perform, and released its Trust Deed given by Mountain West 
America, McDonald Brothers is discharged. This argument also 
fails as a matter of law. McDonald Brothers expressly consented 
3 McDonald Brothers does not challenge the trial court's find-
ing that Security Funding may not be charged with the 
alleged fraud of Sorenson and Zabriskie as a matter of law. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, R. at 532-540. There-
fore, this issue will not be addressed by Security Funding 
in this Brief. 
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to extensions of time and to the release of collateral in the 
Note. McDonald Brothers also verbally consented to any exten-
sions given to Currier. Finally, release of the Mountain West 
Trust Deed did not discharge McDonald Brothers because (1) 
McDonald Brothers cannot and has not shown injury; (2) McDonald 
Brothers' actual or apparent agent, Sorenson, consented to this 
release; and (3) the release was justified because the parties 
intended the property to be temporary collateral. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
McDonald Brothers has appealed both the summary judg-
ment in favor of Security Funding, and the trial court's denial 
of its cross motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. In 
reviewing a trial court's grant of a summary judgment, the 
reviewing court applies the same standard as the trial court. 
That standard is whether, reviewing the entire record as a whole 
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party, there is any colorable evidence creating a genuine issue 
of material fact. See National American Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou 
Country Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 (1965); Thornock 
v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); Blodqett v. Martsch, 590 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). Under this standard, factual findings of 
the trial court are not entitled to any particular deference; and 
the sole question is whether the record supports the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment. Similarly, the standard of 
review on appeal of a trial court's denial of a motion for sum-
mary judgment is whether, viewing the record as a whole, there is 
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any genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
Id. 
A "genuine" issue of fact exists where: 
[t]here is sufficient evidence favoring the 
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for 
that party. [Citations omitted]. If the evidence 
is merely colorable, or is not significantly pro-
bative, summary judgment may be granted. . . . 
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in 
support of the [non-moving party's] position will 
be insufficient. There must be evidence on which 
a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving 
party]. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoid-
ably asks whether reasonable jurors could find, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the plain-
tiff is entitled to a verdict. . . . 
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Frivo-
lous and spurious factual issues will not defeat a motion for 
summary judgment. See Hanko v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1280 
(W.D. Penn. 1984); In re Norsom Manufacturing Reference Labora-
tory, 41 B.R. 846, 847-48 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1984); Bonqiovanni v. 
N. V. Stoomvaart-Maats, 458 F. Supp. 602, 605 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978) (dicta). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF SECURITY FUNDING. 
A. Security Funding's Only Obligation to McDonald Brothers 
was to Disburse $288,000.00 at the Direction of 
Currier/Teplitz. 
Points I and II of McDonald Brothers1 Brief argue that 
the "uncontroverted" and "stipulated" evidence shows that Secu-
rity Funding owed a "duty" to McDonald Brothers to establish an 
escrow for the $288,000.00; and/or assure that the $288,000.00 
was applied to the "closing" of the Currier Loan; and/or to 
assure that McDonald Brothers received its three million dollar 
loan from the proceeds of the Currier Loan (referred to 
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collectively hereafter as the "Duty Arguments"). See McDonald 
Brothers Brief, at 15-19, 21-25. McDonald Brothers also appears 
4 
to argue that its "guaranty" of the Currier loan was expressly 
conditioned on the actual use of the $288,000.00 loan by Currier 
for closing costs, and on Mcdonald Brothers1 receipt of its three 
5 
million dollar loan from the Currier Loan proceeds. McDonald 
4 McDonald Brothers1 characterizes itself on this Appeal as a 
"guarantor" of Security Funding's loan of $288,000.00 to 
Currier. It bears noting that this argument is inconsistent 
with the claims made by McDonald Brothers before the lower 
court, and with the facts alleged in McDonald Brothers1 
pleadings. The McDonald Brothers vigorously argued before 
the lower court that it expected to directly receive the 
$288,000.00, which it would then loan to Currier; and that 
this agreement was breached when the funds were wired to 
Currier/Teplitz. See Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 
paragraph 1, R. at 483-84; Answer and Counterclaim, R. at 
18; Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. at 64, 67; 
Defendant's Responsive Memorandum, R. at 271, 277-278; Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Dismissal and for Summary Judgment, R. at 418; 
Defendant's Responsive Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 429. 
Security Funding does not dispute McDonald Brothers' admis-
sion that it was secondarily liable for the $288,000.00, and 
that Currier was primarily obligated. However, the proper 
legal status of the parties is that McDonald Brothers was an 
"accommodation party" for Currier, based on the fact that 
McDonald Brothers signed a negotiable instrument for the 
$288,000.00 rather than a guaranty. See Memorandum in Sup-
port of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 29-34, 
R. at 392-398. For purposes of this Brief and this appeal, 
whether McDonald Brothers is characterized as a guarantor or 
as an accomodation party to Currier is irrelevant, however. 
5 McDonald Brothers' Brief states: 
[c]ertainly the McDonalds knew and understood that the 
funds Christenson paid would go to a third person. 
That knowledge is fundamental to being a surety, indem-
nitor or guarantor. The McDonalds' expectation, never-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Brothers also claims that "the money [$288,000.00] was not even 
paid to Currier, Tepletz, or anyone else remotely connected with 
the transaction." McDonald Brothers Brief, at 17. 
McDonald Brothers claims that because the above events 
did not occur (1) Security Funding's claim is barred by the doc-
trine of unclean hands; (2) Security Funding has breached an 
implied duty of "good faith and fair dealing"; and (3) Security 
Funding has breached a fiduciary duty owed to McDonald Brothers. 
These various and interrelated arguments of McDonald Brothers 
fail as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts contained 
in the record. 
1.. The Record Shows that Security Funding Wired the 
$288,000.00 to the "Fourex" Account at the Direc-
tion of Currier and Teplitz. 
McDonald Brothers' contention that Security Funding did 
not wire the $288,000.00 to Currier/Teplitz, but instead released 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
theless, was that their property was pledged only if 
the funds being guaranteed were applied to closing the 
Currier loan so that they could get their $3 million 
loan. It was in fact, agreed, and found as a fact by 
the trial judge, that the McDonalds pledged their prop-
erty only in the expectation of receiving financing 
from Currier1 s jumbo loan. . . . 
McDonald Brothers' Brief, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
6 This claim is also inconsistent with McDonald Brothers' 
pleadings. Prior to this Appeal, McDonald Brothers had pled 
and argued that Security Funding released the funds to an 
account over which Sasha Teplitz/Linda Currier had control. 
See Defendant's Responsive Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memo-
randum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, at 17, 
R. at 443; Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum, at 11, R. at 
492; Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. at 72. 
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it to a "stranger" is both unsupported by, and contradicted by 
the record (including the McDonald Brothers1 own pleadings, see 
supra note 6). The record clearly shows (1) that the Taped Con-
versation, heard by McDonald Brothers, provided that the 
$288,000.00 would be wired to an account designated as the 
"Fourex" account, which was under the control of Teplitz, see 
Undisputed Facts paragraph 9, supra at 6-7; and (2) that Security 
Funding in fact wired the $288,000.00 to the "Fourex" account at 
the express direction and instruction of both Teplitz and 
Currier. See Undisputed Facts paragraph 22, supra at 12-13. 
The California deposition of Garrett, dated November 
14, 1983, and published and made a part of the record in this 
case by Judge Murphy's Memorandum Decision and Order, contains 
the most detailed description of the disbursement of the 
$288,000.00 by Security Funding. See Garrett Depo. No. 1, at 
5-6, 11-12, 19-22, 42-43, R. at 718. Security Funding urges the 
Court to read these excerpts from the Garrett Deposition. The 
deposition testimony of others, although less detailed, is con-
sistent with Garrett's California deposition testimony. See 
Undisputed Facts paragraph 22 (containing citations to deposition 
testimony relating to disbursement of the $288,000.00), supra at 
12-13. Indeed, there is no contradictory testimony in the rec-
ord. 
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, 
McDonald Brothers' claim that Security Funding did not wire the 
$288,000.00 to Currier/Teplitz is frivolous and unfounded. 
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2. Security Funding Did Not Have the Duties Alleged 
by McDonald Brothers, 
In determining whether Security Funding had the 
"duties" alleged by McDonald Brothers, this Court must focus on 
the agreement of the parties. This agreement must be found 
either in the written instruments executed by McDonald Brothers; 
or to the extent that these instruments are ambiguous, in extrin-
sic evidence. Security Funding submits that there is no evi-
dence, extrinsic or otherwise, suggesting that it agreed with 
McDonald Brothers to undertake the duties alleged. In addition, 
there is no basis in law for implying these duties. Accordingly, 
all of the arguments made in Points I and II of McDonald Broth-
ers' Brief based on these alleged duties fail, as a matter of 
law. 
(a) Security Funding did not Expressly Agree to 
the Duties Alleged by McDonald Brothers. 
McDonald Brothers cites to deposition testimony indi-
cating that Security Funding representatives and other parties to 
the transaction "expected" the $288,000.00 to be held in an 
"escrow" account until the Currier Loan closed, in support of its 
argument that Security Funding agreed and/or had a duty to estab-
lish the "escrow" or to assure that the $288,000.00 was not dis-
bursed to Currier until the Currier loan closed. See McDonald 
Brothers1 Brief, at 15-18. 
The question before this Court is not the subjective 
expectations of McDonald Brothers or anyone else, but whether 
there is any colorable evidence in the record to show that Secu-
rity Funding promised McDonald Brothers that it would establish 
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an actual escrow account; or assure that the $288,000.00 was 
held in an actual escrow until the Currier Loan closed; or assure 
that the $288,000 was in fact applied to closing costs by 
8 Currier. 
The McDonald Brothers have not cited to any evidence in 
the record showing or even suggesting that Security Funding 
expressly agreed to undertake the duties alleged by McDonald 
9 
Brothers; and indeed, the record contains no such evidence. 
Security Funding's "agreement" was to place the $288,000 "into 
the hands of" Currier/Teplitz," upon being provided with adequate 
security. See Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 34, 71-72, R. at 707, 
713; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 58-60, R. at 699, 714; Undisputed 
Facts paragraphs 9, 12, supra at 6-8. Sorenson solicited 
McDonald Brothers to provide its Note and Trust Deed as security 
for the loan to Currier, and McDonald Brothers did so. See 
Undisputed Facts paragraphs 13-15, supra at 8-10. McDonald 
7 It is clear from the record that the term "escrow" was 
loosely used by the parties to refer to the Fourex account 
controlled by Teplitz. Notwithstanding the use of the term 
"escrow," all parties understood that the $288,000.00 would 
be at "risk" for a period of time until the Currier Loan 
closed, in that the $288,000.00 could be expended without 
the Currier Loan coming through. See Undisputed Facts para-
graph 8, supra at 6. This fact was made clear on the Taped 
Conversation, listened to by all parties including McDonald 
Brothers. See Undisputed Facts paragraphs 8, 13, supra at 
6, 8. 
8 It should be noted that there is no evidence to show that 
the $288,000 was not used for "closing costs." 
9 The deposition testimony relied on by McDonald Brothers 
merely confirms that the $288,000 was to be placed by Secu-
rity Funding "into the hands of Sasha Teplitz;" and that 
Sorenson understood that "the escrow account was Sasha 
Teplitz1 accounts." See McDonald Brothers Brief, at 15-16. 
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Brothers intended and expected to be secondarily liable to 
Currier, the primary obligor. McDonald Brother's Brief, at 1. 
It is undisputed that Security Funding made no representations to 
McDonald Brothers concerning the release of the $288,000,00 to 
Currier. 
Although it was represented by Sorenson, Currier and 
Teplitz, and understood by Security Funding, that Currier needed 
the $288,000.00 loan in order to pay for the closing costs that 
had been incurred for the Currier Loan, Security Funding's loan 
to Currier was not made on the "condition" that the proceeds be 
used for closing costs. Similarly, McDonald Brothers1 Note and 
Trust Deed was unconditional on its face, and was unconditionally 
delivered to Security Funding. The Barrett Title escrow instruc-
tions executed by Stevenson McDonald were also unconditional, and 
simply provided that if the McDonald Brothers' Note in favor of 
Security Funding was not paid within twenty days, the Trust Deed 
could be recorded. See Undisputed Facts paragraph 14, supra at 
9. 
In short, Security Funding made no oral representations 
or agreements to McDonald Brothers (or to anyone else) concerning 
the release of the $288,000.00; and the instruments executed by 
McDonald Brothers in connection with the transaction do not 
require Security Funding to establish an escrow; nor do they 
state that McDonald Brothers' liability is contingent or is oth-
erwise conditioned on a particular use of the proceeds by 
Currier. Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the 
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duties claimed by McDonald Brothers can be implied in law under 
the facts in the record. 
(b) Security Funding Cannot be Charged in Law 
with the Duties Alleged by McDonald Brothers. 
Security Funding is aware of no legal precedent that 
would impose upon it "implied" duties to establish an escrow; or 
to assure that Currier used the $288,000.00 for closing costs; or 
to assure that McDonald Brothers received a three million dollar 
loan promised by Sorenson. See generally, Thormahlen v. Citizens 
Savings & Loan, 73 Or. App. 230, 698 P.2d 512 (1985) (extent of 
lender's common law duty determined by agreement); Seitzinger's, 
Inc. v. National Bank of Washington, 490 F. Supp. 340, 343 
(D.D.C. 1980) ("An undisclosed intention is not to be considered 
in enforcing a contract"); Sessions, Inc. v. Moreton, 491 F.2d 
854 (9th Cir. 1974) (a party who performs as it is entitled to do 
by the terms of its agreement does not violate an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing); see also Kidman v. White, 
14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P.2d 898, 899 (1963) (contracting party is 
bound "only to the extent the terms expressly indicate, or at 
least fairly and reasonably imply"). 
In the absence of fraud attributable to the creditor, a 
guarantorfs liability will not be construed as "contingent" on 
the happening of an event or on the performance of some act by 
the creditor or by a third party, unless such act or contingency 
is set out in the written instrument or is expressly agreed to by 
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the creditor. See Nat. Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors, 
81 Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20, 38-40 (1973); Rucker v. Republic 
Supply Co., 415 P.2d 951, 953 (Okla. 1966); Packaging Corp. of 
America v. Morris, 561 P.2d 680 (Utah 1977); 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guar-
anty S 50 (1973); Baird v. Stephanf 52 N.D. 568, 204 N.W. 188, 
188-90 (1925); Security Nat. Bank of Fargo v. Andrews, 53 N.D. 
328, 205 N.W. 732, 733 (1925); United States v. Everett Monte 
Christo Hotel, 524 F.2d 127, 131 (9th Cir. 1975); Consolidation 
Coal Co. v. Deskins, 178 Ky. 663, 199 S.W. 779, 781 (1918); 
Seitzinger's. Inc. v. Nat. Bank of Washington, 490 F. Supp. 342, 
343 (D.D.C. 1980); Lenwood State Bank v. Lientz, 413 S.W.2d 248, 
255 (Mo. 1967). This is true although the party soliciting the 
guaranty has represented that liability thereunder will be con-
tingent, or that the guarantor will receive some additional bene-
fit in return for executing the guaranty. See Rabon v. Putnam, 
164 F.2d 80, 83 (10th Cir. 1947); First National Bank of Denver 
v. Caro Constr. Co., Inc., 211 Kan. 678, 508 P.2d 516 (1973). 
10 This rule is illustrated by the case of Seitzinger1s, Inc. 
v. Nat. Bank of Washington, 490 F. Supp. 340 (D.D.C. 1980). 
In that case, the creditor sued a guarantor; and the guaran-
tor raised as a defense that it did not intend its guaranty 
to be effective unless and until other guarantors were 
obtained. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated: 
[t]here is no evidence that defendant ever indi-
cated to [the creditor] that the guaranty was not 
to be effective until signed by Mr. Smith. . . . 
An undisclosed intention is not to be considered 
in the process of construing and enforcing a 
contract. 
Id. at 343. 
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The above rules apply whether or not the instrument 
signed by McDonald Brothers is construed as a note or as a guar-
anty. See Piedmont Engineering & Const. Corp. v. BoGradinq Con-
tractors, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 718r 218 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1975); 
Main Bank of Chicago v. Baker, 427 N.E.2d 94, 98-99 (111. 1981); 
Great Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Pima Savings & Loan Assoc, 149 
Ariz. 364, 718 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. App. 1986). 
In this case, any intent or understanding of McDonald 
Brothers that its obligation was conditioned on Security Funding 
establishing an escrow, assuring that the $288,000.00 was used 
for closing costs, or assuring that the $288,000.00 was not dis-
bursed until the Currier Loan closed, was neither stated nor 
agreed to by Security Funding. Indeed, the record shows that 
McDonald Brothers was not even relying on Security Funding to 
assure that these things occurred, but rather was relying on 
Sorenson and Zabriskie. See Undisputed Facts paragraph 15, 
supra at 9-10. 
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that 
Sorenson and Zabriskie actually represented to McDonald Brothers 
that its obligation under the Note and Trust Deed was conditioned 
on the closing of the Currier Loan, or that the $288,000.00 would 
be held in escrow until the Currier Loan closed (contentions that 
find no support in the record), any such representations cannot 
11 It should also be noted that McDonald Brothers1 claim that 
it even had such expectations is open to question, in view 
of the fact that the Taped Conversation clearly indicated 
that the $288,000.00 would be expended whether or not the 
Currier Loan closed. See Undisputed Facts paragraph 8, 
supra at 6. 
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be attributed to Security Funding, as a matter of law. See 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment, 
at 15-26, R. at 380-391. Based on the foregoing, there is abso-
lutely no basis, either in the agreement of the parties or in 
law, for imposing the "escrow" duties alleged by McDonald Broth-
ers on Security Funding. 
3, The Doctrine of "Unclean Hands" is Inapplicable. 
McDonald Brothers makes a bizarre argument on pages 
15-20 of its Brief that because Security Funding failed to estab-
lish an "escrow" and/or failed to assure that the Currier Loan 
closed, it is "responsible" for the McDonald Brothers1 loss and 
therefore cannot enforce the Trust Deed and Note under the doc-
13 trine of "unclean hands." It is obvious from the record, as 
cited to and discussed above, that Security Funding neither 
agreed to nor had any such responsibilities. Moreover, the doc-
trine of unclean hands requires some showing of bad faith, 
oppressiveness, fraud or deceit for its application. See Park v. 
Jameson, 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1, 3 (1961); Jacobson v. 
Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); Seal v. Seal, 212 Kan. 55, 
12 This argument was fully briefed and argued before the trial 
court, which ruled that the alleged representations of 
Sorenson and Zabriskie could not be attributed to Security 
Funding as a matter of law. See Memorandum Decision and 
Order, R. at 532-540. McDonald Brothers have not appealed 
this finding. 
13 This is the first time McDonald Brothers has raised this 
argument. The "unclean hands" defense was not raised in the 
pleadings and was not presented to the trial court. Cf. 
Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740 
(1941) (doctrine of unclean hands cannot be applied for 
first time at appellate level except on a strong showing). 
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510 P.2d 167 (1973). There is absolutely no evidence that Secu-
rity Funding acted unfairly, in bad faith or fraudulently with 
respect to McDonald Brothers. Therefore, the doctrine of unclean 
hands does not apply, as a matter of law. 
4. Security Funding Did Not Breach a Duty of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing. 
McDonald Brothers also argues that Security Funding 
14 breached an implied "duty of good faith and fair dealing" owed 
to McDonald Brothers under the Restatement of Contracts and the 
Uniform Commercial Code, by failing to assure that the 
$288,000.00 was held in escrow and/or was used for closing costs 
for the Currier Loan. The implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing requires good faith both in the performance of contrac-
tual obligations, and in the enforcement of a contract. See 
Restatement (Second) Contracts S 205 (1983). It is not a vehicle 
for imposing contractual obligations where the contract is 
silent, however. 
In support of its argument that Security Funding has 
breached an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, McDonald 
Brothers cites to a number of cases discussing a lender's implied 
obligations to its debtors. These cases are distinguishable from 
this one in respects too obvious and numerous to detail in this 
14 This is also the first time that McDonald Brothers has made 
this argument. Both in its pleadings and before the lower 
court, McDonald Brothers argued that Security Funding acted 
negligently, but did not argue that Security Funding had 
breached implied contractual duties. For this reason, Judge 
Murphy ruled that "there is no evidence to support any claim 
of a duty owed by any plaintiff to defendant. Such a duty 
is a necessary predicate to defendant's negligence counter-
claim." R. at 532-540. 
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Brief. Most significantly, however, in the cases relied on by 
McDonald Brothers the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed 
on the lender simply required good faith in performing an express 
15 
obligation of the contract. In other words, the underlying 
obligation to be performed in good faith was a part of the writ-
ten agreement, and was not itself "implied." See cases cited 
supra note 15. 
In contrast to the cases cited above, McDonald Brothers 
is attempting to imply, from thin air, material contractual obli-
gations in addition to those contained in the written agreement. 
There is no support in the case law for using the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing to impose new and additional contractual 
obligations where the contract is silent. Consistent with this, 
courts hold that a party who performs as it is entitled to do by 
the terms of its agreement does not breach an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. See Sessions, Inc. v. Moreton, 491 
15 See, e.g., Cohen v. Ratinoffy 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. App. 
1983) (lessor must reasonably withhold consent under discre-
tionary contract provision requiring consent to assignment 
of lease); State v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc., 678 
S.W.2d 661, 685 (Tex. App. 1984) (to exercise acceleration 
at will clause, lender must believe in good faith that secu-
rity is impaired); Brown v. Avemco Investment Corp., 603 
F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (acceleration clause must be exer-
cised in good faith); KMC Co., Inc., v. Irving Trust Co., 
757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (duty of good faith required 
lender to give notice before refusing to advance funds under 
discretionary loan agreement); Clayton v. Crossroads Equip-
ment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (creditor must exercise 
good faith in exercising contractual right to repossess col-
lateral on debtor's default); Yankton Production Credit 
Assoc, v. Larsen, 365 N.E.2d 430 (Neb. 1985) (lender's 
refusal to make discretionary advances under loan agreement 
must be in good faith); First Nat'l. Bank v. Twombly, 689 
P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (acceleration clause in loan must be 
exercised in good faith). 
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F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1974); VTRf Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 303 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also Thormahlen v. 
Citizens Savings and Loan, 73 Or. App. 230, 698 P.2d 512 (1985) 
(extent of lender's common law duty determined by agreement). 
As already discussed, Security Funding1s agreement was 
to loan $288,000.00 to Currier, if sufficient security was pro-
vided. In response to this request, Sorenson provided the uncon-
ditional "guaranty" (consisting of the Note and Trust Deed) of 
McDonald Brothers. Security Funding's only "agreement" was to 
disburse the $288,000.00 at the direction of Currier/Teplitz; and 
this is exactly what occurred. See Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 34, 
R. at 707, 713; Sorenson Depo. No. 2, at 58-60, R. at 699, 714; 
supra at 26-28. Security Funding's disbursement of funds at the 
direction of Currier/Teplitz satisfied its obligations to 
McDonald Brothers and rendered McDonald Brothers' Note and Trust 
Deed enforceable. See infra pages 35-41, Section B (discussing 
consideration requirement). Accordingly, McDonald Brother's con-
tention that Security Funding breached an implied obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing fails as a matter of law. 
5. Security Funding Did Not Owe Any Fiduciary Duty to 
McDonald Brothers. 
On pages 27-28 of its Brief, McDonald Brothers argues 
that Security Funding owed fiduciary duties to it as "trustee" of 
a resulting trust for McDonald Brothers' benefit. McDonald 
Brothers also appears to argue that Security Funding owed fiduci-
ary duties to it based on Security Funding's alleged status as an 
"escrow agent." See McDonald Brothers' Brief, at 27-28. Both of 
these arguments are raised for the first time on this appeal. 
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Security Funding agrees with the general rule that an 
escrow agent occupies a fiduciary relation with respect to both 
parties to an escrow. See King v. First National Bank of 
Fairbanks, 647 P.2d 596 (Alaska 1982). However, there is abso-
lutely no evidence in the record to support McDonald Brothers 
contention that an escrow relationship existed between it and 
Security Funding. 
An "escrow relationship11 is defined in the case law as 
follows: 
[a]n escrow relationship is essentially a 
three-party contract* Generally, it arises in the 
first instance by agreement between two parties 
concerning the delivery of an instrument upon the 
occurrence of a specified future condition. The 
instrument is thereafter deposited, by separate 
agreement, with an independent third party with 
instructions concerning its ultimate 
delivery. . . . In the absence of such a tripar-
tite contractual arrangement, the special duties 
of an escrow agent do not attach to a third party 
in possession of the instrument. 
Weiqel v. Hardesty, 37 Colo. App. 541, 549 P.2d 1335 (1976) 
(rejecting claim that attorney had duties of escrow agent). 
Accord, Hiqqins v. Kittleson, 1 Ariz. App. 244, 401 P.2d 412 
(1965); see also Banif Corp. v. Black, 12 Or. App. 385, 507 P.2d 
49 (1973) (escrow agent must be independent from the parties to a 
transaction). 
16 The Nevada Court articulated a similar definition in Hoffman 
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 90 Nev. 267, 523 P.2d 848, 
850 (1974), in rejecting a plaintiff's claim of an escrow on 
summary judgment: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The record contains no evidence to suggest that Secu-
rity Funding had the status of an escrow agent as defined above. 
McDonald Brothers has not alleged an "agreement" between itself 
and anyone else whereby it would conditionally deposit the Note 
and Trust Deed with Security Funding to be held until the per-
formance of a specified condition (presumably the closing of the 
Currier Loan). Rather, McDonald Brothers deposited its Note and 
Trust Deed with Barrett Title, with instructions that the Trust 
Deed could be recorded if the Note was not paid in twenty days. 
See Undisputed Facts paragraph 14, supra page 9. 
Moreover, even if McDonald Brothers was to claim that 
such an agreement existed, for example, between itself and 
Currier or Sorenson (a contention also without support in the 
record), Security Funding obviously could not function as an 
escrow agent because it is not independent, but rather is a party 
to the very documents to be deposited in the alleged escrow. See 
Banif Corp. v. Black, 12 Or. App. 385, 507 P.2d 49 (1973). 
Finally, to have the duties of an escrow agent, Security Funding 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
[a] valid escrow agreement is a triangular 
arrangement. First there must be a contract 
between the seller and the buyer agreeing to the 
terms and conditions of the deposit, then there 
must be delivery of the items on deposit to the 
escrow agent, and he must agree to perform the 
function of receiving and disbursing the items. 
The agreement by the buyer and the seller to all 
the terms of the escrow instructions and the 
acceptance by the escrow agent of the position of 
depository create the escrow. 
Hoffman, at 850. 
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would have had to receive delivery instructions from the two par-
ties to the escrow agreement, and would have had to agree to act 
as a depository on behalf of the two parties to the escrow agree-
ment. There is no evidence of any of these prerequisites to an 
escrow arrangement, and therefore McDonald Brothers1 claim that 
Security Funding owed it a fiduciary duty as an escrow agent 
fails as a matter of law. 
McDonald Brothers1 "resulting trust" theory similarly 
fails as a matter of law, on the ground that there is absolutely 
no evidence in the record to establish any element necessary to a 
claim that Security Funding held the $288,000.00 as trustee of a 
resulting trust in favor of McDonald Brothers. A resulting trust 
is based on intent, and arises only where all the facts and cir-
cumstances show that the parties intended that one party hold 
property in trust for the benefit of the other. See Jones v. 
Jones, 459 P.2d 603 (Okla. 1969). Therefore, McDonald Brothers' 
admission that it was secondarily liable for the $288,000.00, and 
that Currier was the primary borrower precludes any claim that 
Security Funding was to hold the $288,000.00 in trust for 
McDonald Brothers' benefit. Accordingly, McDonald Brothers' 
"resulting trust" theory fails as a matter of law. 
There are no other facts in the record that could con-
ceivably support McDonald Brothers' claim of a fiduciary duty 
owed to it by Security Funding. Under Utah law, a fiduciary duty 
must be based either on a long-standing relationship of trust and 
confidence that allows one party to dominate and influence the 
other, or on the existence of a traditional fiduciary 
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relationship such as an attorney/client relationship. See Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). Neither of these 
17 
requirements are satisfied here, as a matter of law. 
B. McDonald Brothers1 Note and Trust Deed are Supported by 
Consideration 
McDonald Brothers makes three arguments in support of 
its claim that the Note and Trust Deed are not supported by con-
18 
sideration. These arguments are addressed below. 
17 It is obvious that Security Funding does not occupy a tradi-
tional fiduciary relationship with McDonald Brothers. The 
relationship between Security Funding and McDonald Brothers 
is one of debtor and creditor. Both the Restatement of 
Trusts and the Utah case of Denshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust, 
27 Utah 364, 49 P.2d 403 (1934), state that a creditor does 
not owe a fiduciary duty to its debtors. See Restatement of 
Trusts § 12 comment b (1959); see also American Bank of Com-
merce v. Corolo. 88 N.M. 405, 540 P.2d 1294, 1296 (1975) 
("No authority is cited for the remarkable proposition that 
a bank owes fiduciary duties to its debtors and obligors. 
Notwithstanding the growth of consumerism, this nirvana is 
yet to be reached"). 
There is also no evidence of any kind of a relationship of 
trust and confidence between Security Funding and McDonald 
Brothers that would give rise to a fiduciary duty. In fact, 
neither Howard nor Stevenson McDonald met or even spoke to 
Security Funding representatives until nearly one year after 
Stevenson McDonald executed the Note and Trust Deed. See 
Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Memorandum, at 12, paragraph 
26, R. at 377. 
18 McDonald Brothers1 third "argument" on the consideration 
issue can be addressed in a footnote. On page 36 of its 
Brief, McDonald Brothers apparently argues that because 
Security Funding "agreed" to loan $288,000.00 to Currier 
before Sorenson solicited security from McDonald Brothers, 
the Note and Trust Deed are not supported by consideration. 
It is clear from the record that Security Funding's "agree-
ment" to loan $288,000.00 to Currier was contingent upon 
receiving sufficient collateral; and that the loan was not 
in fact made Security Funding had assured itself that it had 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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McDonald Brothers argues on pages 29-33 of its Brief 
that the consideration "bargained for" by McDonald Brothers was 
"the promise of Christenson to pay the closing costs on the 
Currier loan, so that the McDonalds could obtain their $3 million 
financing." McDonald Brothers Brief, at 30. In support of this 
argument, McDonald Brothers cites various cases to the effect 
that a failure of consideration occurs if the lender fails to 
perform a material promise, or if an express condition to liabil-
ity fails to occur or is not performed. See, e.g., Silver Waters 
Corp. v. Murphy, 177 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1965); Benson v. Andrews, 
138 Cal. 2d 123, 292 P.2d 39 (1955); and Grebe v. Swords, 149 
N.W. 129 (N.D. 1914) (relied on by McDonald Brothers). 
Security Funding does not dispute the general rule of 
the authorities relied on by McDonald Brothers. Rather, it dis-
putes McDonald Brothers1 claim that Security Funding "promised" 
or "agreed" that the $288,000.00 would be used for closing costs, 
or that McDonald Brothers' liability was "conditioned" on such 
use or on receiving a three millon dollar loan. Absent colorable 
evidence of such a "promise" either made by or attributable to 
Security Funding, McDonald Brothers' consideration argument fails 
as a matter of law, for the reasons discussed in detail below. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
sufficient collateral, which included the security provided 
by McDonald Brothers. See Undisputed Facts paragraphs 12, 
21, supra at 8, 11-12. 
The deposition testimony of Sorenson relied on by McDonald 
Brothers simply does not stand for the cited proposition, 
when read in context. See Sorenson Depo. No. 1, at 23-36, 
R. at 707, 713. 
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1. Security Funding's Payment of $288,000.00 to 
Currier at Her Direction is Consideration for the 
Note and Trust Deed. 
As previously noted, (see supra page 19 note 4) prior 
to this appeal McDonald Brothers argued that the $288,000.00 loan 
was to it, not Currier; and that because Currier received the 
loan proceeds rather than McDonald Brothers, the Note was not 
supported by consideration. In refuting this argument before the 
trial court, Security Funding cited to evidence in the record 
establishing (1) that McDonald Brothers knew and understood that 
it would not receive the loan proceeds and that the proceeds 
would be disbursed to Currier; and (2) that McDonald Brothers did 
not expect to control the disposition of the $288,000.00 to 
Currier. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment, at 27-29, R. at 390-393; Plaintiff's Reply to 
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 8-18, R. at 502-412. The trial 
court agreed. See Memorandum Decision and Order, R. at 532-540. 
Now McDonald Brothers has changed its story, and appar-
ently concedes that the loan proceeds were to be disbursed to 
Currier, and not to it. McDonald Brothers' Brief, at 1 and note 
1. Regardless of whether McDonald Brothers is viewed as a "maker" 
of a note; as an "accommodation party" to Currier; or as a "guar-
antor" of Security Funding's loan to Currier, however, the same 
result is reached on the consideration issue. See supra at 19 
note 4. 
As argued in detail in Security Funding's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 393-399, a maker of 
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a note need not receive the note proceeds for consideration to 
exist. Consideration for a note exists where the proceeds are 
distributed to a third party with the maker's acquiescence or 
consent. See Unruh v. Nevada Nat. Bank, 88 Nev. 427, 498 P.2d 
1349 (1972); see also Villeqas v. Bagwell, 529 P.2d 1011 (Okla. 
1974). 
Similarly, the disbursement of loan proceeds to the 
principal debtor provides consideration for a guaranty, as a mat-
ter of law. See Paul Revere Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Weis, 
535 F. Supp. 379, 385 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Public Loan Co., Inc. v. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 803 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp., 655 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1982). A guaranty is also supported by consideration if 
the lender extends credit in reliance on it. See Bank of Idaho 
v. Collev. 103 Idaho 320, 647 P.2d 776, 782 (Idaho App. 1982). 
Finally, an accommodation party is liable if the pri-
mary obligor receives the loan proceeds. See Bank of America 
Nat. Trust & Savings Assoc, v. Goldstein, 25 Cal. App. 2d 37, 76 
P.2d 545, 547 (1938); Luby v. Jefferson County, 28 Colo. App. 
441, 476 P.2d 292, 294 (1970). 
The record shows that Currier, the primary obligor, 
"received" the $288,000.00, in that the money was wired to the 
"Fourex" account of Teplitz at Currier1s express direction and 
with her express consent. See supra at 20-21; Unruh v. Nevada 
National Bank, 498 P.2d 1349 (Nev. 1972). As already discussed, 
McDonald Brothers1 speculation that the proceeds were not wired 
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to Currier or Teplitz, but were disbursed to a complete stranger 
is frivolous and unsupported by the record. 
The record further shows that McDonald Brothers gave 
the Note and Trust Deed to Lamoreaux with the intent and expecta-
tion that these documents would be used to induce Security Fund-
ing to loan $288,000,00 to Currier. See Undisputed Facts para-
graph 14, supra at 9. Finally, the record shows that Security 
Funding detrimentally relied on the security provided by McDonald 
Brothers in disbursing the $288,000.00 to Currier. See Undis-
puted Facts paragraphs 12, 21, supra at 8, 12. This undisputed 
evidence establishes that the instruments executed by McDonald 
Brothers are supported by consideration, whether or not McDonald 
Brothers is viewed as maker, guarantor or accommodation party. 
2. Security Funding Did Not Promise or Agree that the 
$288,000.00 Would be Used for Closing Costs or 
that McDonald Brothers1 Obligation was 
Conditional. 
McDonald Brothers attempts to avoid the general rules 
set out in Subsection 1 above by arguing that it bargained for, 
and received, the "promise" of Security Funding "that the closing 
costs on the Currier Loan would be paid so that the McDonalds 
could secure their three million dollar loan." McDonald 
Brothers's Brief, at 31. It is true that the general rules dis-
cussed in Section 1 above may not apply where a debtor's obliga-
tion is effectively conditioned on an act or event besides the 
disbursement of proceeds to the principal debtor; or where a 
creditor has expressly promised some additional performance to 
the debtor. In such a case, the failure of a condition, or the 
creditor1s breach of an additional promise may render the 
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obligation unenforceable for failure of consideration. Cf. 
Benson v. Andrews, 292 P.2d 39 (Cal. App. 1955) (lender's failure 
to furnish advances as expressly agreed constitutes failure of 
consideration) (cited by McDonald Brothers). 
As already discussed in detail on pages 22-28 of this 
Brief, however, the record does not contain a shred of probative 
evidence that Security Funding "promised" McDonald Brothers that 
the $288,000.00 loan would be used for closing costs; or that 
McDonald Brothers' obligation was conditioned either on Currier's 
use of the loan proceeds for closing costs, or on McDonald Broth-
ers receiving their $3 million loan. In addition, these obliga-
tions cannot be implied in law. See supra at 25-28. Finally, 
Security Funding cannot be bound by any representations or agree-
ments made by Sorenson in order to induce McDonald Brothers to 
execute the Note and Trust Deed. See Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 15-27, R. at 380-392; 
Memorandum Decision and Order, at 532-540. Accordingly, McDonald 
Brothers' consideration defense fails as a matter of law. 
3. The Trial Court's Ruling that the Note and Trust 
Deed was Supported by Consideration is Supported 
by Its Findings of Fact. 
McDonald Brothers strangely argues, on pages 33-36 of 
its Brief, that statements made by the trial court in its Memo-
randum Decision and Order show that it did not receive considera-
tion for the Note and Trust Deed. This argument reflects a fun-
damental misconception concerning the scope of this Court's 
review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary 
judgment. As stated on pages 17-18 of this Brief, this Court 
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stands in the same position as the trial court, and reviews the 
record as a whole. 
In any event, however, the trial court's statement that 
McDonald Brothers "understood that the proceeds of the loan which 
its Trust Deed and Note secured would be paid to another person 
to be used as closing costs for the Currier loan" obviously can-
not be interpreted as a "finding" by the trial court that 
McDonald Brothers' obligation was conditioned on such use. This 
and similar statements in the Memorandum Decision and Order must 
be viewed in the context of McDonald Brothers' argument at that 
time, which was that it was to directly receive the proceeds, not 
Currier. See supra page 18, note 4. This was the focus of the 
trial court. Moreover, as already noted, McDonald Brothers' 
unspoken "understanding" concerning the contemplated use of the 
loan proceeds does not operate to impose any duties on Security 
Funding with respect to such use, as a matter of law. See supra 
at 25-31. 
C. McDonald Brothers' is not Released of Its Obligations 
Under the Note. 
McDonald Brothers argues that it is released from lia-
bility under the Note as a matter of law: (1) because the time 
for Currier to perform was "extended" by Security Funding; (2) 
because Security Funding released "the interim collateral fur-
nished by Mountain West;" and (3) because Security Funding nego-
tiated an increased "bonus" from Currier. See McDonald Brothers' 
Brief, at 37 (emphasis added). 
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1. McDonald Brothers Consented to Extensions of Time 
for Repayment and to the Release of Collateral in 
the Note. 
McDonald Brothers relies on Utah Code Ann. S 70A-3-606 
(1981) for the argument that it is released by Security Funding's 
"extension" of the time for repayment to Currier. This Section 
provides as follows: 
(1) The holder discharges any party to the 
instrument to the extent that without such party's 
consent the holder 
(a) without express reservation of rights 
releases or agrees not to sue any person against 
whom the party has . . . a right of recourse or 
agrees to suspend the right to enforce against 
such person the instrument or collateral . . .; or 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral given by 
or on behalf of the party or any person against 
whom he has a right of recourse. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606 (1981) (emphasis added). 
Effective consent to an extension of time for repayment 
or to the release of collateral may be given in advance in the 
instrument itself. See William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial 
Code Series § 3-606:06, at 66 (1984) (cited as Hawkland). 
Accordingly, courts uniformly enforce express provisions of notes 
and guaranties providing that the parties thereto consent to 
extensions of the time for repayment or to the release of collat-
eral. See, e.g., Schauss v. Garner, 590 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Wyo. 
1979); Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. Southeastern 
Uni-Loader, 134 Ga. App. 156, 213 S.E.2d 536, 537 (1975); Liberty 
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Interstate Motel Developers, 346 F. 
Supp. 888, 889-90 (S.D. Ga. 1972); see also Cessna Finance Corp. 
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v> Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Utah 1978) (enforcing guarantor's 
waiver of notice of default contained in instrument). 
As in the cases cited above, McDonald Brothers 
expressly consented to all extensions of the time for repayment 
and to the release of any collateral in the Note itself. The 
express terms of the Note executed by McDonald Brothers are as 
follows: 
[t]he makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers 
hereof severally waive presentment for payment, 
demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of 
this note, and consent to any and all extensions 
of time, renewals, waivers or nullifications that 
may be granted by the holder hereof with respect 
to the payment or other provisions of this note, 
and to the release of any security, or any part 
thereof, with or without substitution. 
See H. McDonald Depo., Exhibit 1 (emphasis added), R. at 703, 
709. 
McDonald Brothers argues that the language quoted above 
does not apply to any extensions given to Currier. This argument 
is inconsistent with its argument that McDonald Brothers1 was 
merely the "guarantor" of Currier's primary obligation to Secu-
rity Funding, however. It is undisputed that Security Funding 
made only one loan for $288,000.00, and that Currier was primar-
ily obligated to repay this loan, while McDonald Brothers1 was 
only secondarily obligated. Thus, any payments by Currier would 
necessarily be applied to and would reduce the obligation of 
19 McDonald Brothers under the Note. Given these facts, any 
19 In fact, payments by Currier (i.e., received from the fore-
closure on Currierfs California real property) were in fact 
applied to the balance due under the Note. See R. at 409. 
-43-
extensions of time granted to Currier fall within the express 
consent provisions of the Note signed by McDonald Brothers, as an 
Mextension[s] of time . . . granted . . . with respect to the 
payment , . . of this note," In other words, any extension to 
Currier, whom McDonald Brothers concede was primarily liable for 
the $288,000,00, and whose payments would be applied to satisfy 
McDonald Brothers' obligations under the Note, constitutes an 
"extension . . . with respect to the payment" of the $288,000.00 
Note executed by McDonald Brothers. 
Moreover, even if this Court should find that the con-
sent language in the Note is not applicable, the undisputed evi-
dence in the record shows that McDonald Brothers in fact were 
informed of, and consented to, an extension of the time for 
Currier to perform. Both Howard and Stevenson McDonald indicate 
that they were still hopeful that the Currier Loan would close as 
late as the summer of 1982. See Undisputed Facts paragraph 28, 
supra at 15. During their meetings with Security Funding at that 
time, McDonald Brothers agreed that the time should be extended 
for Currier's performance. H. McDonald Depo. at 48-49. Consent 
to an extension can be given either before or after the fact. 
See U.C.C. § 3-606, Official Comment 2. 
2. Security Funding's Release of the Mountain West 
America Property Does Not Discharge McDonald 
Brothers. 
Security Funding submits that McDonald Brothers 
expressly consented to the release of any security for its obli-
gation in the Note. The Note clearly states that McDonald Broth-
ers f,consent[s] . . . to the release of any security, or any 
-44-
part thereof, with or without substitution." This language con-
stitutes effective "consent" to the release of the Mountain West 
property under Section 3-606 as a matter of law. See Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Security Mortgage, 701 P.2d 1095, 1098 
(Utah 1985) (holding that guarantors had agreed to waive any 
defenses based on impairment of collateral, based on language of 
instrument). 
In addition, Security Funding's release of the Mountain 
West property does not discharge McDonald Brothers because the 
release was "justified." See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606(b) 
(1981) ("unjustified" impairment causes discharge). It is undis-
puted that the Mountain West security was not intended to secure 
the McDonald Brothers' obligation, but rather was intended only 
to be "interim" security, see McDonald Brothers1 Brief at 37, 
that would be released when a title report was obtained on the 
McDonald Brothers1 and Currier's property. See Undisputed Facts 
paragraph 18, supra at 10-11. In addition, McDonald Brothers, 
through their actual or apparent agent Sorenson, contracted with 
Security Funding to release the Mountain West collateral pursuant 
to the prior understanding of the parties. See Undisputed Facts 
paragraph 26, supra at 13-14. Based on these facts, Security 
Funding was entitled to release the Mountain West property, and 
Section 3-606 does not apply. 
Finally, even if the Court finds: (1) that there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to support McDonald Brothers' 
claim that the the Mountain West property was given as additional 
security for its obligations under the Note; and (2) that 
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McDonald Brothers did not consent to the release either in the 
Note itself or thereafter through its agent Sorenson, McDonald 
Brothers has failed to identify any evidence in the record to 
show that the release of the Mountain West collateral harmed 
McDonald Brothers. The rule is that a holder discharges a party 
to an instrument only to the extent that his unjustifiable 
impairment of collateral has caused injury. The standard for 
determining "injury" based on impairment of collateral is the 
extent to which the collateral, if not released by the creditor, 
could have been used to satisfy the obligations on the instru-
ment. See Christensen v. McAtee, 256 Or. 333, 473 P.2d 659 
(1970); Farmers State Bank of Oakley v. Cooper, 227 Kan. 547, 608 
P.2d 929, 936 (1980). McDonald Brothers have the burden of proof 
to show the amount or value of the alleged impairment. Id. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to indi-
cate that the Mountain West collateral had any value. Indeed, 
the evidence in the record indicates that the title search for 
the Mountain West property was falsified, and that the Trust Deed 
obtained by Security Funding was in fact valueless. See Undis-
puted Facts paragraph 18, supra at 10-11. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's conclusion 
that McDonald Brothers had not introduced sufficient evidence to 
support its claim of discharge is supported by the record, and 
must be upheld. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS TO SECURITY FUNDING. 
In response to McDonald Brothers' argument that Secu-
rity Funding was awarded excessive fees and costs, Security 
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Funding refers this Court to its "Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Objection to Proposed Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure 
and Order of Sale and Motion for Reconsideration, and in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike," R. at 627-638. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MCDONALD BROTHERS' SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTION. 
McDonald Brothers does not argue on this Appeal that 
issues of fact prevent this Court from affirming summary judgment 
in favor of Security Funding. Rather, McDonald Brothers argues 
that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as a matter 
of law. In order to prevail on this argument, McDonald Brothers 
must establish at least one of its defenses to the enforcement of 
the Note and Trust Deed as a matter of lav. However, as argued 
in detail above, all of McDonald Brothers' defenses fail as a 
matter of law. Moreover, if this Court were to rule that summary 
judgment in favor of Security Funding was improperly granted, 
factual issues would then preclude summary judgment. There are a 
number of factual arguments raised in the pleadings that the 
trial court found it unnecessary to reach in granting Security 
Funding's Motion for Summary Judgment, which Security Funding is 
entitled to present. 
CONCLUSION 
McDonald Brothers has contrived a number of defenses to 
Security Funding's enforcement of its Note and Trust Deed, many 
of which are raised for the first time on this Appeal. When the 
facts in this case are analyzed, it is clear that McDonald Broth-
ers' defenses have no merit, as a matter of law. Accordingly, 
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this Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary -judg-
ment in favor of Security Funding. 
DATED this aQ**~ day of December 1987. 
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